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Abstract. The theory of the firm and the profit maximization have been important areas of 
debate among Islamic economists as being fore bearers of applicability of conventional 
economic theory in the Islamic economics. One strand of the debate holds the view that the 
postulate of profit maximization, as a useful theoretical construct, has to be modified for a 
firm operating in an Islamic economy, while the other strand highlights that Islamic 
economy has its own normative rules with an underlying institutional scaffolding derived 
from the Qur’an and Sunnah. Following the second view, this paper is a modest 
contribution to the debate by demonstrating that once an institutional scaffolding containing 
the rules of behavior compliant with the Qur’an and Sunnah is in place, the profit 
maximization postulate becomes a useful concept in Islamic economic theory. The paper 
also shows that allocation efficiency with equity is possible provided that the firm is rule-
compliant, even in case of a monopoly. 
Keywords. Allocative efficiency, Firm theory, Profit maximization, Profit sharing, Islamic 
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1. Introduction 
slamic finance has drawn a lion’s share of theattention of Muslim economists 
over the last three decades. Nevertheless, some important contributions have 
been made to other issues in macro and micro economics. In the latter area, 
theory of the firm in general and the profit maximization postulate in particular 
have been the focus of debate as flag bearers of applicability of conventional 
economic theory in Islamic economics. Thus far, two views have emerged from the 
debate. Majority view holds that the postulate is a useful theoretical construct but 
has to be modified before it is applicable to a firm operating in an Islamic system.
1
 
The minority view, on the other hand, argues that the theory of firm and the 
postulate of profit maximization is applicable to an Islamic economy provided that 
the normative structure, derived from the Qur’an and Sunnah, is in place.  
The first view was initially articulated by Metwally (1992) who modified the 
profit maximizing objective by introducing “charity” as an additional argument of 
the objective function.
2
 A number of papers advocating the first view followed 
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Metwally (1992) by maximizing a utility function for the entrepreneur which 
included various additional elements as arguments of the objective function (Azid, 
Asutay, & Khawaja, 2008; Yusof & Amin, 2007).  A clear position that emerges 
out of the last three decades of debate on this issue is that of Azid, Asutay, & 
Khawaja (2008), who, after a succinct review of various contributions to the 
debate, suggest that “…we cannot tame markets with the cane of legislation. 
Hence, firms cannot be forced to act morally in such a market. We need to 
transform the market into an ethicized market by means of endogenizing the moral 
elements in all socioeconomic menus, preferences, institutions and interactions”. In 
other words, if the rules, or institutional structure, of behavior are internalized, i.e., 
the normative structure is in place, the positive theory can and do serve useful 
purposes.  What is encouraging about the contributions of scholars to the theory of 
firm behavior in an Islamic setting is their willingness to address contemporary 
challenges based on their own direct understanding of the rules of behavior 




Early contributions by Al-Junaid (1992) and Iqbal (1992) are the best 
articulations of the second view, which has two components.
4
The first component 
argues that an Islamic economy operates on the basis of rules that constitute its 
institutionaland its normative structure (Al-Junaid, 1992; Iqbal, 1992; Mirakhor & 
Askari, 2010; Mirakhor & Hamid, 2009; Mirakhor, 2009). Once these are in place, 
positive theories of firm behavior, among other theoretical constructs, can yield 
valuable insights as guide to policy. The second component argues that the profit 
maximization postulate is an efficiency criterion and, as such, it is applicable to an 
Islamic economy, provided that the normative structure represented by the 
institutional framework, derived from the Qur’an and Sunnah, is in place (Al-
Junaid, 1992; Iqbal, 1992). In his various papers, Hasan (1983; 1992; 2011) has 
focused on these two aspects of the postulate by arguing that the postulate, despite 
its shortcomings, particularly on empirical ground, is still “needed in Islamic 
economics, as well” (Hasan, 1992) and, that the profit maximization, along with 
other postulates of neoclassical economics, finds applicability in Islamic economics 
as “these postulates have also to be the fulcrum of the new discipline for its 
survival” (Hasan, 2011). Moreover, he asserts that “the profit maximization 
postulate is of global connotation, and has for that reason more and wider 
expository and predictive powers. Also, it admirably helps explain adjustments 
between the changes occurringwithin and between markets” (Hasan, 2002). 
In the light of the second view, this paper focuses on those contributions to the 
theory of firm in an Islamic context that rely on [Islamic] rules of economic 
behavior in light of their authors’ understanding of the Qur’an and Sunnah (Al-
Junaid, 1992; Azid et al., 2008; Bendjilali & Taher, 1990; Hasan, 1983; 1992; 
2002; 2011; Iqbal, 1986; 1992; Sugema, Bakhtiar, & Effendi, 2010). Among these, 
Hasan (1992), Bendjilali & Taher (1990) and Sugema, Bakhtiar, & Effendi (2010) 
explicitly model firm behavior in an Islamic context.
5
 It can be argued that 
compliance with the rules prescribed by the Qur’an and Sunnah will ensure that in 
the long run there is no excess profit as a firm in an Islamic economy is perceived 
“as a cooperative-competitive organization” (Azid et al., 2008). 
The term “cooperative” derives from the direct imperative of the Qur’an that 
command cooperation while “competitive” derives from the necessity of efficiency 
in use of resources and their preservation (Azid et al., 2008).
6
 It is argued that 
conditions specified for markets in an Islamic economy yield results thatmimic 
those of perfect competition (Islahi, 1982; 1985).  If that is the case, then straight 
forward application of profit maximization leads to allocative efficiency, at least in 
the long run. In the short run, however, technological progress, innovations, 
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location and other factors can, and often do, result in excess profit. Bendjiali & 
Tahir (1990) address the question of whether in an Islamic economy the operations 
of a rule-compliant firm with monopoly power result in loss of efficiency in 
resource allocation. Their answer is that it need not.
7
 This paper is intended to 
make a modest contribution to the ongoing debate by suggesting that: (i) profit 
maximization as an efficiency criterion is useful in an Islamic economy, (ii) that 
this need not mean a sacrifice of equity, and (iii) that these assertions hold even if 
there are market imperfections. In the conventional economic theory, more often 
than not, it is thought that there is a trade-off between equity and efficiency.  
Market imperfections, it is argued, exacerbates the trade-off. While it can be 
demonstrated that in a rule-compliant Islamic economy, without market 
imperfections, both efficiency and equity are achieved, this note addresses a more 
challenging issue. Following Bendjiali & Tahir (1990), the paper demonstrates that 
even in case of a monopoly, allocation efficiency with equity is possible provided 
that the monopolist is rule-compliant.  
 
2. Debates on the Postulate of Profit Maximization 
After explaining what maximization of profit means in the mainstream 
economic theory, Hasan (2011) argues that while this postulate has been criticized 
much even within conventional economics, it continues to survive because: (i) 
without it the process of price formation in different markets and under different 
conditions would be difficult to explain, and (ii) no other theoretical construct has 
been offered as its replacement having the same degree of explanatory and 
predictive power. He goes on to suggest that Shari’ah alternatives offered by 
Islamic economists, such as “fair profit” are unworkable and asserts that, due to its 
limitations, “a fair profit notion in theory and practice take us back to the 
maximization of profit issue”.  If there are to be normative modifications of profit 
maximization, they should be introduced into the external environment of the firm 
by “public policy” (Hasan, 2011). Profit maximization itself is “value neutral” and 
“it is a powerful tool for economic analysis; it moves market to equilibrium. It can 
be and is used with legal provision to safeguard against potentially undesirable 
consequences. Shari’ah provides ample protection to both consumers and the hired 
factors of production against profit seeking at their cost. Islamic economics need 
not throw away the baby with the bath water...” (Hasan, 2011).   
Hasan (2011) asserts that theoretical constructs such as profit maximization 
“constitute minimal tools needed to explain and investigate economic phenomena 
to help formulate theories with predictive ability needed to guide economy policy”. 
Criticism of the postulate by Islamic economists, e argues, is due to 
“misconceptions” by them and their detractors. Both are engaged in “misplaced 
argumentation” by being “oblivious to simple principle of logic that one must 
compare the ideals of his system with the ideals – not realities – of the other.  
Islamic economists invariably err in comparing the ideals of their system based on 
what ought to be with what is of capitalism in operation” (Hasan, 2011).  Similarly, 
the critics of Islamic economics“attack Islamic ideals for erecting an economic 
system as having failed citing the conditions as they are in the present day Muslim 
countries” (Hasan, 2011). 
One of these“misconceptions” is the apparent confusion between “profit 
maximization” and “seeking maximum profits”. They are two different concepts. 
The former is a technical efficiency criterion referring to resource allocation and 
distribution. It is based on a set of logical propositions and is derived from the 
Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics. The latter, however, is a conjecture 
relating to the presumed “greedy” and “avaricious” behavior of capitalists. It is a 
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conjecture that is not anchored on a set of logical propositions discernible from the 
discussions ofthis topic in the Islamic economics literature. Most of the writings, 
generally, make conjectural modifications in the, basically, neoclassical 
maximization models (Amin & Yusof, 2003; Yusof & Amin, 2007) 
Subjectively modifying theoretical constructs through simple conjectures that 
are not anchored on a set of logical propositions leads to “misconceptions”. This is, 
perhaps, the reason for Hasan’s (2011) appeal that “Islamic economists can 
contribute to the effort by eschewing subjectivity coloring their thought process...”. 
This paper is a modest response to this appeal in its attempt to demonstrate the 
validity of the position advocated by Al-Junaid (1992), Iqbal (1992) and Hasan 
(2011) that once an institutional scaffolding containing the rules of behavior 
compliant with the Qur’an and Sunnah is in place, the profit maximization 
postulate becomes useful, in Islamic economic theorizing. 
In a thought experiment, Hasan (2011) asks the reader to “suppose one had a 
magic wand that could be used for making competition perfect in all sorts of 
markets – the ideal of capitalism. Then, one could presumably venture the 
demonstration that much of the divergence between the ideal Islamic economic 
structure and that of capitalistic order evaporated into thin air”. Whether such 
demonstration of convergence of the “ideal” Islamic system and capitalism is 
possible is an open question. Nevertheless, there has been an important class of 
literature specifying appropriate binding rules for function of markets in an Islamic 
economy that, while predating development of conventional economics by 
centuries, resemble those defined for perfect competition. For example, Islahi 
(1982; 1985) writing on the “economic concepts” of Ibn Taymiyyah suggests that 
the latter, based on his understanding of the Qur’an and Sunnah, “had at least some 
of the conditions of perfect competition in mind” when expressing his views on the 
functioning of the market and “had a clear conception of a well-behaved, orderly 
market, in which knowledge, honesty and fair play, and freedom of choice were the 
essential elements”.8  The implication is that if there is rule compliance in the 
economy, then results similar to those achieved in the ideal model of perfectly 
competitive economy will be obtained. Specifically, this means that there would be 
no excess profits. While such results could be demonstrated, it is perhaps more 
challenging to show that even in case of a strong non-competitive form of market 
imperfection, i.e. monopoly, allocative efficiency and equity obtain provided that 
the institutional structure representing operationalized rules of economic behavior, 
as prescribed by the Qur’an and Sunnah, are in place in the economy. The only 
additional objective requirement that need enter the theoretical construction is 
profit-sharing as suggested, for example, by Hasan (1992) and by Sugema, et.al. 
(2010). 
In the Islamic economics literature relating to the theory of the firm, one 
encounters an implicit assumption that the operations and forms of firms in an 
Islamic economy would look much the same as those in the capitalist system 
except that their objective function is modified somewhat. This assumption has not 
been examined critically. In conventional economics in the late 1930s, Coase 
(1937) began to raise a concern that economic theory had never defined a “firm”. 
Coase’s (1937) paper was all but ignored until the 1960. Since then much has been 
written expounding and expanding his work leading to the transaction cost theory 
of the firm. Other theories of the firm, such as contract theory or the property rights 
theory of the firm, have also been developed since the 1970s.
9
  These theories are 
ex-post explanations for the form and substance of “firms” in market capitalism. 
The economic system of market capitalism and the forms of business organizations 
that developed within it are historical phenomena. There has never been an ex-ante 
theory for either. Even today, there is no uncontested theory to explain why market 
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capitalism traversed the unique historical trajectory that resulted in its present 
configuration. While it is possible to find elements common to an Islamic 
economic system and market capitalism, given the differences in their initial 
positions and in rules governing economic behavior, it would seem important to 
investigate the likelihood that had the Islamic economy stayed rule compliant after 
the Prophet Muhammed (pbuh), the trajectory of its development would have 
yielded the same configuration as that of contemporary market capitalism. 
There are at least two ways by which such a study could be undertaken.  One 
way would be to specify clearly the rules that govern economic behavior and the 
actual functioning of the market at the time of the Prophet Muhammed (pbuh) and 
then investigate the historical deviation from the archetype system established by 
him in Medina to determine how far the system deviated from its archetype model 
and whether the accumulated deviations were significant enough to allow the 
emergence of the contemporary configuration of economies in Muslim countries.  
To an extent, this is the approach adopted by Chapra (2010). The other is to specify 
the rules and investigate the resulting economic system and the functioning of its 
market and the firms within it. The related literature in Islamic economics follows 
the second approach. Regardless of which approach is adopted, it would be useful 
to investigate whether the known binding constraints such as the existence and 
operation of rules – such as justice, sharing, reciprocity, cooperation, redistributive 
mechanisms, rules governing production and consumption, inheritance laws, 
property rights and others – would lead to same system as market capitalism.10 
Some of these institutions exist in market capitalism others do not. For example, 
concern with equity, a fundamental objective of an Islamic system, is a relatively 
new phenomenon in contemporary market capitalism as is the recognition of the 
need for government intervention to correct market failure.   
In conventional economics it was not until the 1970s when concerns with 
economic and social justice found its clear theoretical expression and gained the 
attention of economists
11
. To date, however, no operational propositions have 
resulted from the justice criteria developed in the substantial and growing literature 
on socio-economic justice.  In Islam, however, the criterion of justice and 
conditions under which it obtains are ex-ante, simple and operational. The criterion 
contains two principles each of which can be stated as the corollary of the other. 
The first is: positioning all things in their rightful place (ةقحلا اهعضاىم يف رىملأا عضو) 
and, the second principle is: giving each their rightful due (  يذ لك ءاطعإقحهقح ). 
Both conditions would be met and justice obtained if and when the economy and 
its participants become compliant with rules prescribed by the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah. It is perhaps the second principle that prompts Hasan (1992; 2011), 
Sugema, et.al. (2010) and others to suggest that applied to firm’s behavior it would 
mean justice is served when each factor of production receives the value of its 
marginal product. This objective, these scholars suggest, is best achieved through 
profit sharing. This proposition will be employed in this paper to derive a sharing 
rule that potentially can ensure both allocative efficiency and equity as understood 
from the second principle of justice. 
Principle of profit sharing has attracted attention in the conventional theory of 
the firm since the 1960s.
12
 Much of this literature deals with the question of how to 
best elicit maximum productivity from labor given that, it is argued, hired labor on 
fixed wages has an incentive to shirk from working. A good part of this literature, 
therefore, is focused on the search for “incentive-compatible” labor contracts. 
Some form of profit sharing, in addition to fixed wages, is incorporated in the 
theories of “incentive-compatibility”. Because “it is the separation of ownership 
and labor that creates the characteristic motivation problem of the capitalist 
enterprise”, profit sharing “will be incentive compatible” (Kroszner & Putterman, 
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2009). The theoretical research of the 1980s and 1990s on this issue reached the 
conclusion “that the problem of eliciting effort from workers may be 
fundamentally transformed by profit sharing” (Putterman, 1993). The theory 
suggested, moreover, that a possible incentive-compatible contract would be a 
linear combination of fixed wages and a share of the profit of the firm (Berhold, 
1971; Weitzman & Kruse, 1990; Weitzman, 1984; 1986). 
Importantly, empirical research on actual profit-sharing arrangements in place 
in market capitalism suggests that there are favorable incentive effects that accrue 
to firms that implement these arrangements. It is thought that one reason for this 
improved productivity response of workers to profit sharing is workers’ mutual 
monitoring efforts to ensure that shirking is minimized. This is unlike the 
indifference to other workers’ productivity effort that permeates non-profit-sharing 
arrangements.
13
 It appears that a linear combination of wages and profit share is 
what Hasan has in mind when he asserts that the absence of an interest rate 
mechanism “and profit sharing with labor” in an Islamic economy “may lead to 
several consequences promotive of growth and distributive justice” (Hasan, 1992). 
He suggests that “Islam would prefer the whole value product minus depreciation 
and a minimum maintenance wage as profit to be shared between labor and capital 
on some agreed equitable basis” (Hasan, 1992). It can be shown that, even with 
market imperfections assumed in models suggested by Hasan (1992) and by 
Bendjiali & Taher (1990) allocative efficiency with equity is possible without the 
necessity of adding anything, like a minimum wage, to the neoclassical profit 
maximization other than requiring that profit is shared in toto between labor and 
capital. 
As noted earlier, an Islamic economy is a rules-based system defined by an 
institutional structure – a network of rules of behavior – that characterizes the 
system. These rules are enunciated in the Qur’an and operationalized by the 
Prophet Muhammed (pbuh) during his lifetime, especially during the period he 
served as the temporal authority in Medinah. It was during this latter period when 
He established a market for Muslims and operationalized the rules governing 
market behavior. These rules have been identified and explained elsewhere and 
will not be repeated here.
14
 Among these rules are those specified for market 
participants. It is argued that compliance with these rules results in efficient and 
equitable outcome (Ahmad, 1982; Hasan, 2002; 2011; Siddiqi, 2002). In particular, 
production will be efficient because it is subject to the binding rules
15
 that induce 
economizing in producer behavior (in addition to the usual cost-saving behavior 
that is part and parcel of theory of the firm). Furthermore, equity will be obtained 
because the principle of justice requires each factor to receive the full value of its 
contribution to production, andprofit-sharing arrangement ensures that excess 
profit is shared between factors of production. This would imply that efficiency 
and equity criteria require that the firm operate on its production function, that 
marginal rate of substitution among factor inputs equal the ratio of their prices, and 
that there be no excess profit in a rule-compliant market.  A compelling case can be 
made that this efficiency-equity result is a logical consequence of rule compliance 
that leads to perfectly competitive conditions being satisfied. However, a more 
interesting case would be to demonstrate these results in the case where there is 
market imperfection assumed by Bendjiali & Taher (1990). 
 
3. Theoretical Construct 
Realistically, even in a fully rule-compliant economy, existence of factors that 
can lead to monopoly power such as technological progress, innovation, economies 
of scale, external economies (location and economics of agglomeration) among 
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others - cannot be ruled out. The question is: how will a rule-compliant firm 
withmonopoly power behave to ensure that both allocative efficiency and equity 
criteria are satisfied. The following theoretical construct is intended to provide a 
tentative answer to this question by assuming that a firm produces an output (Q) 
with two inputs, labor (L) and capital (K). It hires labor at the wage rate (w) 
prevailing in the rule-compliant market. It raises capital through ex-ante (before 
production and sale of output) profit-loss-sharing arrangement. The funds thus 
raised and the amount of capital purchased with these funds give the price per unit 
of capital (r). Being rule compliant regarding distribution, the firm knows that all 
profits must be distributed among factor inputs, including entrepreneurial effort 
subsumed under one or the other inputs. 
There are three possible cases during the post-production and sale of output: 
(a)Profits are exhausted by payments to inputs as agreed in the pre-production 
phase, i.e. rKwL  , where  is the profit of the firm; or (b) there are losses, 
i.e. rKwL  , in this case the loss is shared among the equity holders based 
on pre-production profit and loss sharing arrangements; or (c) there are excess 
profits, i.e. rKwL  . The focus of this paper is on the latter case, as the other 
two pose no particular challenge. Specifically, the paper asks: is there a rule which 
the firm can follow in distributing excess profits that ensures allocative efficiency 
and equity. It is envisioned that there are two sets of factor prices 𝑟and 𝑤 in the 
pre-production and sale phase and 𝑟 and 𝑤 in the post-production and sale phase, 
respectively. The production function of the firm is assumed to be ),( KLfQ  16.  
The firm’s demand function is given by )(QPp  and its revenue function 
(concave) is QQPQR )()(  .  Its cost function is rKwLKLC ),( .  The 
firm’s profit function is thus: )()(),,( rKwLQQPKLQ  . While the firm 
is committed to distribute all profits among factor inputs, capital (equity) has a 
prior claim arising from pre-production profit-loss-sharing arrangement.  
Therefore, if there is any excess profit, capital has a prior claim to a share.  The 
firm then operates under the constraint that: 
 
𝑃 𝑄 𝑄 − 𝑤 𝐿 − 𝑟𝐾 ≤ 0        (1) 
 
In the pre-production phase, the funds available to the firm to pay labor 
is𝑃 𝑄 𝑄 − 𝑟𝐾 .  However, if there are excess profits, the firm, based on its 
commitment to the rule of justice, knows that a share must be allotted to labor, thus 
ensuring that𝑤 > 𝑤.  Hence, the firm has an additional constraint that: 
 
𝑃 𝑄 𝑄 − 𝑟𝐾 ≤ 𝑤 𝐿                                                                                   (2) 
 
Subtracting wL  from both side of this constraint and taking all terms to the left-
hand side yields 
 
𝜋 𝑄, 𝐿. 𝐾 −  𝑤 − 𝑤 𝐿 ≤ 0        (3) 
 
The allocative efficiency issue arises because distributing more than a fair share 
to either input tilts resource allocation in favor of that input in violation of justice 
and no waste rule, i.e. more of that input will be used than necessary. What is 
needed is a distribution rule that ensures justice and allocative efficiency; that the 
right amount of inputs are used in production. To search for such a rule the 
following problem can be formulated. 
 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 3(3), T. Akin, & A. Mirakhor, p.560-574. 
567 
567 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒𝜋 𝑄, 𝐿. 𝐾 = 𝑃 𝑄 𝑄 −  𝑟𝐾 + 𝑤𝐿       (4) 
 
Subject to the constraints that: 
Q − 𝑓 𝐿, 𝐾 ≤ 0            (5) 
 
𝜋 𝑄, 𝐿. 𝐾 −  𝑟 − 𝑟 𝐾 ≤ 0                                                                        (6) 
 
𝜋 𝑄, 𝐿. 𝐾 −  𝑤 − 𝑤 𝐿 ≤ 0                                                                       (7) 
 
With this formulation, the constrained optimization problem can be solved to 
arrive at simple rules governing the distribution. As is demonstrated in the 







            (8) 
 
meaning that so long as the firm distributes profits such that this equation is 
satisfied equity and allocative efficiency are ensured. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper has been an attempt to make a modest contribution to the ongoing 
debate about the efficacy and the extent of usefulness of the profit maximization 
postulate in the nascent development of theory of the firm in Islamic economics. 
The paper has considered two positions prevalent in the debate. One suggests that 
an economy in Islam would be a rules-based system. The rules are prescribed in the 
Qur’an and operationalized by the Prophet Muhammed (pbuh). These rules 
constitute the institutional scaffolding for the operation of the economy. Among 
these are rules governing the behavior of market participants. Whereas in market 
capitalism the market is considered as constituting the system, in an Islamic 
economy it is a mechanism among others, albeit a crucially important one, to 
achieve the economic objectives of the society. Hence, this view suggests that in an 
Islamic economy, assumption of compliance with the rules and their 
internalizations by participants prior to market entry, plus regulation and 
supervision of the market itself, would make it possible to use the profit 
maximization postulate as an efficiency criterion to gain insights into the question 
of how firms would behave in such a system.  The other view, while not rejecting 
the usefulness of the postulate altogether, suggests various modifications before 
applying it to determine firm behavior in an Islamic economy. 
A number of scholars assert that in a rule-compliant Islamic economy, markets 
display characteristics that mimic the results obtained under conditions of perfectly 
competitive markets. If so, profit maximization postulate can be applied directly to 
determine necessary and sufficient conditions for allocative efficiency.  It is argued 
that the distribution rule under these conditions requires that each factor receives 
the value of its marginal product, a result that converges to the concept derived 
from the Islamic principle of justice that each factor of production receives its just 
due.  A more interesting question than the one posed under conditions similar to 
perfect competition is raised by Benjiali & Taher (1990). They ask whether there is 
any loss of efficiency if markets are not perfect. Specifically, they consider the case 
of monopoly operating in an Islamic economy. They demonstrate that, in a specific 
formulation of this problem, there need not be efficiency loss. This paper 
formulates the monopoly question in a setting different from that of Benjiali and 
Taher(1990). It shows that by requiring profit sharing among factors of production, 
it is possible to obtain a simple distribution rule that achieves allocative efficiency 
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with equity. It is perhaps worth noting that the procedure suggested here can be 





Given the formulation earlier, the Lagrangian is formed as: 
 
𝐻 𝑄, 𝐿. 𝐾, 𝜆1, 𝜆2, 𝜆3 =  1 − 𝜆2−𝜆3 𝜋 𝑄, 𝐿. 𝐾 − 𝜆1 Q − 𝑓 𝐿, 𝐾   
+𝜆2 𝑟 − 𝑟 𝐾 + 𝜆3 𝑤 − 𝑤 𝐿                                                                       (A1) 
 
The Kuhn-Tucker necessary – also sufficient due to the assumption of the concavity of revenue 




=  1 − 𝜆2−𝜆3 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑄











+ 𝜆2 𝑟 − 𝑟  
       = − 1 − 𝜆2−𝜆3 𝑟 + 𝜆1
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝐾










+ 𝜆3 𝑤 − 𝑤  
       = − 1 − 𝜆2−𝜆3 𝑤 + 𝜆1
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝐿




𝐾 =   1 − 𝜆2−𝜆3 𝑀𝑅 − 𝜆1 𝑄 = 0                                                                 (A5) 
 




𝐿 =  − 1 − 𝜆2−𝜆3 𝑤 + 𝜆1
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝐿
+ 𝜆3 𝑤 − 𝑤  𝐿 = 0                                      (A6) 
 








= −𝜋 𝑄, 𝐿. 𝐾 +  𝑟 − 𝑟 K 0                                                       (A8) 
    
𝜕𝐻
𝜕𝜆3








= −𝜆2 𝜋 𝑄, 𝐿. 𝐾 +  𝑟 − 𝑟 K = 0                                                (A11) 
    
𝜕𝐻
𝜕𝜆3
= −𝜆3 𝜋 𝑄, 𝐿. 𝐾 +  𝑤 − 𝑤 L = 0                                  (A12) 
     
where 0,, 321  . 
 
Noting that under the production assumptions 𝜆𝑖 ≥ 0 , 𝑄, 𝐿, 𝐾 > 0 and by resorting to 
complementary slackness conditions, the above Kuhn-Tucker conditions may be reduced to the 
following three necessary and sufficient conditions for a maximum: 
 





=  1−𝜆3 𝑟 − 𝜆2𝑟                                                                                     (A14) 
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=  1−𝜆2 𝑤 − 𝜆3𝑤                                                                                    (A15) 
 










=  1−𝜆2 𝑤 − 𝜆3𝑤 > 0                                                                            (A17) 
 
Invoking the implicit functions theorem, the marginal rate of substitution of the two factor inputs 













 1−𝜆3 𝑟−𝜆2𝑟 
 1−𝜆2 𝑤−𝜆3𝑤 
                               (A18) 
 
Recalling that the firm is rule compliant and observes the rule of no-waste as well as that of just 
distribution, the firm must then operate on its production function and not bias the distribution of 
post-production and sale excess profits in favor of either input. This would mean that (A8) and (A9) 




= −𝜋 𝑄, 𝐿. 𝐾 +  𝑟 − 𝑟 K > 0                                                      (A8’) 
    
𝜕𝐻
𝜕𝜆3
= −𝜋 𝑄, 𝐿. 𝐾 +  𝑤 − 𝑤 L > 0                                                     (A9’) 
 







                                 (A19) 
 





                                (A20) 
 
An efficiency ratio can be constructed between the two marginal rates of factor substitution with 
and without excess profits, 
 
 1−𝜆3 𝑟−𝜆2𝑟 




 1−𝜆3 𝑟−𝜆2𝑟 





𝑀𝑅𝑆𝐾𝐿  𝑤𝑖𝑡 ℎ  𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
𝑀𝑅𝑆𝐾𝐿  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡  𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
                (A21) 
 
It can be argued plausibly that the above efficiency ratio must be strictly equal to one for 
efficiency to prevail in the excess profit case. If the ratio is greater or less than one, resources are 
misallocated in favor of one or the other factor of production. The above efficiency ratio can be 





− 1 = 𝜆3  
𝑤 
𝑤
− 1                               (A22) 
 







                                 (A23) 
 
which provides a simple distribution of excess profit rule that ensures allocative efficiency. The rule 
requires that the firm set 𝑟 to satisfy (A23). It is worth noting that substitution of (A19) in (A22), the 
efficiency multipliers, and manipulating yields: 
 
𝑤𝐿 = 𝑟𝐾                                (A24) 
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1  For a survey of these positions, see (Yusof & Amin, 2007). 
2  See Iqbal (1992) for a succinct criticism of this modified form. 
3 See (Yusof & Amin, 2007). There is a trend among some, however, to adopt uncritically and 
wholesale the thoughts of scholars of centuries past to address contemporary problems. An example 
is the full adoption of and application to, inter alia, firm and consumer behavior the theory of 
“Shari’ah objectives” developed centuries ago. A compelling argument can be made that this 
theory, first developed by scholars such as Imam Al-HaramainJuwayni, later adopted and refined by 
scholars such as Ghazali and Shatibi, was a response of scholars of early and middle ages of Islam 
to the problems and challenges of their time and their environment. Al-HaramainJuwayni, for 
example, developed his views to assist the population of new Muslims outside of the Arabian 
Peninsula who were not familiar with the Qur’an and Sunnah. The view on “Shair’ah objectives” 
was developed to guide these societies. The ideas developed by scholars such as Al-Haramain 
Juwayni on the “Shari’ah objectives” were firmly based on their understanding of the Qur’an and 
Sunnah, as well as, on their perception of the dynamics of the societies they lived in, as well as, on 
the received knowledge. By the time scholars such as Ghazali and Shatibi arrived on the scene, the 
dynamics of the society had changed as had its challenges. For example, Ghazali had to face 
challenges posed by intellectually more aware society that had access to a treasure trove of 
translated philosophical works of Greek, Indian, Roman, Persian and other thoughts. Muslim 
philosophers such as Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Ikhwanus Safu, Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd had developed 
an impressive corpos of Islamic philosophy in light of the Qur’an and Sunnah (Mirakhor, 2003). 
The strength and influence of these intellectual achievements in developing critical thought were 
such that, in the minds of conservative scholars, created a threat to the “pristine” Islamic message. 
Ghazali’s response was an all-out attack, in defense of the purity of Islamic thought, against what he 
saw as serious deviations introduced by philosophy, philosophers, Zandaqa and Zandeeqs. Ibn 
Rushd’s valiant counter-attack notwithstanding, Ghazali’s thoughts, including his understanding of 
“Shari’ah objectives”, won the day, lionized, and adopted officially thus overshadowing any other 
understanding that could have stimulated a different trajectory of intellectual progress. It is 
significant that Ghazali himself based nearly all of his writings on his understanding of the Qur’an 
and Sunnah as well as his perception of challenges of his own time and environment rather than 
uncritical adoption of received thought. This applies not only to his writings on philosophy but in 
all dimensions of social problems as well including economics. Instructive is, for example, his 
arguments on the prohibition of Riba, debasing of currency, rules of market behavior, among others.  
Criticisms of earlier scholars, their thoughts and their applicability to contemporary socio-economic 
problems are not the intention here. Rather, it is the wholesale and uncritical adoption of them that 
is at issue. Uncritical and unmodified adoption of solutions offered long ago to problems defined by 
a different time and environment would appear to need a strong assumption that the internal and 
external dynamics of contemporary society and thought are the same as those of centuries ago.  It 
also sends a signal of the paucity of thought and weakness of the intellectual ability of today’s 
Muslims to develop ideas and solutions in response to contemporary challenges and problems of 
humanity in light of their own understanding of the Qur’an and Sunnah as was done by the scholars 
of the middle ages of Islam. Both the assumption and the signal run counter to the reality of 
applicability of the two primary sources of Islamic thought as well as to the demonstrated strength 
of the intellectual capabilities of contemporary Muslims. The Qur’an is taken axiomatically to be 
applicable to all times and in all environments.  So is the Sunnah of the Messenger (sawaws) that 
expounds, interprets and operationalizes the rules prescribed by Allah s.w.t.  Scholars of each 
generation need to apply these two primary sources to solve the problems of humanity of their time 
and environment. Of course, the thoughts of earlier generations must be studied exhaustively, 
diligently but critically for any guidance they can provide.   
4  See also the comments on Al-Junaid (1992) paper by Ayubur Rehman Bhuyan in (Ahmad & Awan, 
1992). Iqbal’s (1992) unequivocal position is lucidly expressed in his presentation. 
5 In Bendjilali & Taher (1990) model, there is, however, no explicit production function. Also, in 
Hasan’s (1992) model there is no derivation of rules of profit sharing between capital and labor. 
6 For a more detailed discussion see Ahmad (1982), Siddiqi (2002), Islahi (1985), and Khan & 
Mirakhor (1989). 
7 Bendjiali & Tahir (1990) assume that the Muslim entrepreneur maximizes utility as a function of 
profit and social welfare. They assume social welfare is “a function of the firm’s output” but social 
welfare does not enter into the utility function in a functional form but directly as output. Since 
profits, as the other argument of the utility function is also dependent on output, utility becomes a 
function of output. 
8 See also Siddiqi (2002), Ahmad (1982) and Chapra (2010). 
9 See Penrose (1958); Alchian & Demsetz (1972); Demsetz (1967; 1982; 1983); Jensen & Meckling 
(1976; 1977; 1979); Hart (1989); Bowles (1985); Bowles & Gintis (1993a; 1993b); Malmgren 
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(1961); Ross (1973; 1974); Williamson (1964; 1967; 1979; 1985; 1994); Williamson & Winter 
(1991); Furubotn (2001); Furubotn & Pejovich (1972); Cheung (1969; 1983); Chandler (1977); 
Fama (1978; 1980); Fama & Jensen (1983a; 1983b). 
10 See Cizakca (2011) for a comprehensive historical analysis. 
11 See, for example, Rawls (1971); Nozick (1974); Buchanan (1984); Sen (2009).   
12  See Alchian & Demsetz (1972); Nalbantian (1987); Milgrom & Roberts (1988; 1990; 1992); 
Berhold (1971); Blinder (1990); Weitzman & Kruse (1990); Baker, et.al. (1988); Itoh (1989); 
Holmstrom & Tirole (1989); Holmstrom (1982); Holmstrom & Milgrom (1991); Kruse (1988); 
MacLeod (1988); Neuberger (1973); Putterman (1988; 1993); Weitzman (1984; 1986); Haque & 
Mirakhor (1986). 
13 See Weitzman (1984; 1986); Weitzman & Kruse (1990); Baker, et.al. (1988); for discussions of 
mutual monitoring and related incentives see Macleod (1988); Dong (1991); Dong & Dow (1993); 
Bradley & Gelb (1981); Fitzroy & Kraft (1986). 
14 See Islahi (1982); Siddiqi (2002); Ahmad (1982); Hasan (1992; 2002; 2011); Mirakhor & Hamid 
(2009); Mirakhor & Askari (2010); Azid, et al. (2008). 
15 Such as no waste (Israf), no destruction (Itlaf), and no opulence (Itraf). Note that these binding 
rules modify the conventional notion of “economic efficiency”. Price of a product plays an 
important role in the conventional conception of “economic efficiency”. While this would also find 
application in a theory of the firm in an Islamic economy, practical implementation subject to the 
binding rules of no waste, no destruction, and no opulence render the results different in the two 
systems. For example, a dairy farmer in the conventional system may find it “economically efficient 
to destroy excess supply of milk because the price is too low. Similarly, cattlemen may destroy a 
herd because beef prices are too low. Such practices are not permissible in an Islamic economy. 
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